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Rhode Island and Sports Law
Adam Epstein*
INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this Article is to offer an overview on how Rhode
Island, the smallest U.S. state geographically,1 has had a moderate
influence in sports law. The Article will serve as a solid resource
for the academic, practitioner, student and others interested in
sports law generally and its relationship to Rhode Island. While
the depth of sports law material from the state relative to others is
not is overwhelming, Rhode Island jurisprudence in this field has
been compelling and influential well beyond its borders with its
prominent gender discrimination cases involving the Equal Protection Clause of the U.S. Constitution and Title IX, the 1970s genderequity law.
After an exploration of a few sports-related tort cases, the Article will delve into the several decades-old state and federal cases
involving whether a boy may participate on a high school girls’ field
hockey team, whether a boy could participate on a girls’ volleyball
team, and whether a girl could play Little League Baseball. Of
course, the Article will also examine the well-known Title IX saga
involving Brown University’s unsuccessful attempt to eliminate
several sports in the 1990s that led to a decades-long settlement.

* Professor, Department of Finance and Law, Central Michigan University, Mount Pleasant, Michigan. The material in this article was utilized in an
online presentation “Rhode Island and Sports Law” presented to the Mid-Atlantic Academy of Legal Studies in Business (MAALSB) on March 19, 2021.
Special thank you to all attendees.
1. See Fun Facts & Trivia, RI.GOV, https://www.ri.gov/facts/trivia.php
[https://perma.cc/EUG5-6VJC].
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Finally, the Article will provide a short summary of other
sports law topics relevant to the state. It will conclude with a brief
encounter in other state sport-related statutes involving sports officials, the adoption of the Uniform Athlete Agents Act, the 2018
authorization of sports wagering in Rhode Island, the School and
Youth Programs Concussion Act (SYPCA), and others. Perspectives on how Rhode Island decisions fit into an overall U.S. sports
law perspective are scattered throughout and provided for context.
I.

SPORTS TORTS

A. Participation Cases
In the 2000 decision, Kiley v. Patterson,2 Lori Kiley, playing
second base, sued for injuries to her knee after colliding with Steven
Patterson during a coed, recreational softball game.3 The Supreme
Court of Rhode Island held that the duty of care owed by the athletic event participants to each other during a sport activity is not
measured by ordinary negligence.4 Instead, for a participant-plaintiff to prevail, the party must prove willfulness or recklessness on
the part of the other participant.5 According to the Rhode Island
Supreme Court, the trial court (Superior Court) did not actually determine if Patterson’s slide was merely negligent or if he acted in
reckless disregard of injuring Kiley when he slid into her.6 Put differently, there remained an issue as to whether Patterson executed
a “take-out slide” in violation of the rules of baseball and softball.7
The Supreme Court remanded the case for a trial accordingly to
make this determination.8

2. Kiley v. Patterson, 763 A.2d 583 (R.I. 2000).
3. Id. at 584 (“Presumably, he sought to break up a possible double play
and force out at second base. In throwing himself into a slide, however, Patterson raised at least one of his feet high enough off the ground to cause it to
collide with Kiley’s knee as he slid into second base.”).
4. Id. at 585 (citing Stanley L. Grazis, Annotation, Liability of Participant
in Team Athletic Competition for Injury to or Death of Another Participant, 55
A.L.R. 5th 529, 537 (1998).
5. Kiley, 763 A.2d at 585.
6. See id. at 587.
7. See id. at 584.
8. Id. at 587.
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While Kiley has had minimal legal impact outside of Rhode Island,9 this decision is in-line with most other states by applying the
“reckless disregard” standard as the appropriate standard in these
types of recreational and sporting cases involving injuries between
participants themselves.10 This standard is well-established and
traces its roots to the classic Illinois soccer case Nabozny v. Barnhill,11 in which a soccer goalkeeper was kicked in the head after
catching the ball inside the penalty zone. That court held the defendant had a duty to refrain from conduct proscribed by safety
rules and could be liable for deliberate, willful or reckless disregard
for safety of others.12 A minority of courts, however, use a negligence standard rather than the reckless disregard standard as in
Kiley.13
9. Of the 19 citing decisions as offered by a Lexis Advance® search, only
five references were from other states, including: Connecticut, Iowa, Maryland, and Maine (last conducted Oct. 28, 2021).
10. See, e.g., Erica K. Rosenthal, Inside the Lines: Basing Negligence Liability in Sports for Safety-Based Rule Violations on the Level of Play, 72
FORDHAM L. REV. 2631, 2647-2648 (2004) (“Most courts hold that a defendant’s
conduct must be at least reckless before the plaintiff can recover for his injuries. Thus, even if negligence is proven, no liability will attach.”); see also
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS, Liability for Physical and Emotional Harm, §
2 (AM. L. INST. 2010) (referencing the decision and others, “Comment b. Significance. Cases recognizing a recklessness standard of liability for harm caused
during recreational and sporting activities include Knight v. Jewett, 834 P.2d
696 (Cal. 1992) (coed touch football); Jaworski v. Kiernan, 696 A.2d 332 (Conn.
1997) (coed soccer); Hoke v. Cullinan, 914 S.W.2d 335 (Ky. 1995) (tennis); Gray
v. Giroux, 730 N.E.2d 338 (Mass. App. Ct. 2000) (golf); Ritchie—Gamester v.
City of Berkley, 597 N.W.2d 517 (Mich. 1999) (ice skating at ice arena); Ross v.
Clouser, 637 S.W.2d 11 (Mo. 1982) (slow-pitch soft-ball); Dotzler v. Tuttle, 449
N.W.2d 774 (Neb. 1990) (pickup basketball); Schick v. Ferolito, 767 A.2d 962
(N.J. 2001) (golf); Marchetti v. Kalish, 559 N.E.2d 699 (Ohio 1990) (game of
“kick the can”); Kiley v. Patterson, 763 A.2d 583 (R.I. 2000) (coed soft-ball);
Monk v. Phillips, 983 S.W.2d 323 (Tex. App. 1998) (golf).”).
11. See Nabozny v. Barnhill, 334 N.E.2d 258, 260-61 (Ill. App. Ct. 1975).
The Kiley decision cites Nabozny at 586.
12. For a Rhode Island soccer case in which a high school soccer player was
seriously injured by a water drain that was partially covered by grass and just
out of bounds from the field itself, see Morales v. Town of Johnston, 895 A.2d
721, 731 (R.I. 2006) (holding “that Johnston owed the plaintiff a special duty
of care to protect her from a dangerous condition on the athletic field. We are
satisfied that a jury, based on this record, reasonably could find Johnston liable
for negligently allowing a dangerous condition on its premises and negligently
failing to warn plaintiff of this danger.”).
13. See Rosenthal, supra note 10, at 2653 (citing LaVine v. Clear Creek
Skiing Corp., 557 F.2d 730, 735 (10th Cir. 1977); Babych v. McRae, 567 A.2d
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Rhode Island has addressed negligence issues involving athletic participants in other cases as well. For example, in the 1975
decision Salk v. Alpine Ski Shop, Inc.,14 the Rhode Island Supreme
Court denied a plaintiff-skier’s appeal of a Superior Court’s directed
verdict against the seller and manufacturer of ski bindings.15 The
defendant installed and adjusted the ski bindings according to
plaintiff’s height, weight, and skiing ability.16 Though the equipment worked properly on four separate occasions, the fifth resulted
in the plaintiff breaking his leg after falling, attributing the harm
to the bindings which should have released but failed to do so.17
Unfortunately for plaintiff Burton Salk, the Rhode Island Supreme Court held in favor of the directed verdict for the defendants
because it agreed that Salk failed to demonstrate that the bindings
were adjusted improperly, that he met the requisite speed for the
bindings to release, or that the failure to release caused the injury
itself.18 The Court opined that Salk failed to produce evidence accordingly, and that his inference of the harm resulting from the failure of the bindings to release “becomes mere conjecture and speculation.”19 Thus, the Court affirmed that the trial court judge did
not err in granting the motion for a directed verdict.20

1269, 1270 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1989); Duke’s GMC, Inc. v. Erskine, 447 N.E.2d
1118, 1124 (Ind. Ct. App. 1983); Auckenthaler v. Grundmeyer, 877 P.2d 1039,
1043-44 (Nev. 1994); Lestina v. W. Bend Mut. Ins. Co., 501 N.W.2d 28, 33 (Wis.
1993)).
14. Salk v. Alpine Ski Shop, Inc., 342 A.2d 622 (R.I. 1975).
15. Id. at 624.
16. Id. at 624.
17. Id. (offering that the complaint against Alpine and Cubco, the manufacturer, included eight counts of liability to include breaches of express and
implied warranties, strict liability and negligence).
18. Id. at 625.
19. Id. (stating, “A plaintiff may not rely on conjecture or speculation to
establish the essential elements of his case, and thus the trial justice did not
err in directing a verdict on this count.).
20. Id. (authoring, “In the instant case, plaintiff did not allege that had he
been warned of the inevitable dangers of skiing, he would not have skied; nor
did he allege that he would have purchased other bindings and that other bindings would have prevented his injury. Quite to the contrary, the record indicates that despite his knowledge of the risks involved in the sport, plaintiff has
continued to ski. Even viewing this evidence in a light most favorable to the
plaintiff, we cannot find any grounds on which a jury would conclude that the
alleged defect caused plaintiff’s injury.”). Today, Rhode Island does have a
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Two other participation cases are worthy of exploration in
Rhode Island sports law. In the 1983 decision in Fiske v. MacGregor,21 high school football player Kelly Fiske was left a quadriplegic after unsuccessfully attempting to make a first-half, touchdown-saving tackle in a 1974 football game.22 A year later, on
September 22, 1975, Kelly filed a lawsuit, claiming in negligence,
breach of implied warranty, and strict liability and that the injury
was caused by the defective design of the football helmet by MacGregor Manufacturing Company.23 The lawsuit also claimed that
his injury was due to the negligent coaching and supervision by the
varsity football coach of Cranston East and the Cranston School
Committee.”24
After six years of discovery and a twenty-one day trial involving thirty-six witnesses, the jury ruled in favor of the coach and
committee.25 However, the same jury found that MacGregor was
liable under strict liability and breach of implied warranty attributing forty percent fault to Kelly and sixty percent fault to MacGregor.26 This comparative fault analysis reduced the jury award
of $3,500,000 by forty percent resulting in a verdict of $2,100,000
plus interest.27 Both sides appealed the decision, but the Supreme
Court of Rhode Island affirmed.28

statutory framework for ski-area operators and skiers. See Responsibility and
Liability of Ski Operators and Skiers, 41 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 8-1 to 8-4 (2019).
21. Fiske v. MacGregor, 464 A.2d 719 (R.I. 1983).
22. See id. at 721 (offering that after the collision, Kelly “lay motionless on
the ground, suffering from a spinal cord injury that rendered him permanently
quadriplegic.”).
23. Id. Throughout the decision, the court noted that the issue of whether
the design of the face mask was defective was a proper question for the jury,
and expert witnesses were offered by both parties. Accordingly, the court affirmed that the denial of a motion for a new trial was correct, stating “…we are
of the opinion that the demonstrations, along with the conflicting testimony of
the parties’ experts, presented factual issues that were correctly left for the
jury to decide. The trial justice did not overlook or misconceive material evidence, nor was he otherwise clearly wrong in denying defendant’s motion for a
new trial.” Id. at 724-25.
24. Id. at 721.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 729 (“[W]e feel that the application of comparative-negligence
principles to strict liability and implied warranty achieves a fair and equitable
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Cases involving sport equipment, such as football helmet cases,
often result in mixed decisions.29 As in negligence cases, the results
rest on jury decisions and expert testimony as to whether a manufacturer produced a helmet that was defective either in warning,
design, or the manufacturing process.30 The Fiske decision, like Kiley, discussed supra, is referenced in the Restatement Third of
Torts.31
Finally, in Schultz v. Foster-Glocester Reg’l Sch. Dist.,32 the
Rhode Island Supreme Court reversed summary judgment for the
defendants and held that Patricia Schultz, a fourteen-year-old
cheerleader from Ponaganset Middle School, could sue Foster-Glocester Regional School District after a “basket-toss” maneuver went
wrong as she missed the mat and injured her elbow.33 On December 27, 1996, the lawsuit alleged that Foster-Glocester “was negligent in failing to properly train, supervise, instruct, provide proper
equipment and provide proper post-injury treatment for Patricia
during and after cheerleading practice.”34
Despite the trial court finding that no special duty was owed to
the cheerleader, and, in fact, the public-duty doctrine provided immunity, the Supreme Court of Rhode Island disagreed, vacating

result in the apportionment of damages.”). As of June 18, 2019, Lexis Advance® search demonstrates fifty-four citing decisions of the case.
29. See Adam Epstein, Sales and Sports Law, 18 J. LEGAL ASPECTS OF
SPORT 67, 80 (2008).
30. Id. (referencing the Fiske decision and others including Gentile v. MacGregor Mfg. Co., 493 A.2d 647 (N.J. Super. 1985); Eldridge v. Riddell, Inc., 626
So. 2d 232 (Fla. Ct. App. 1993); Bell Sports, Inc. v. Yarusso, 759 A.2d 582 (Del.
2000).
31. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS, Products Liability, § 17 (2010)
(cited in comments a, “For authority supporting the proposition that the majority of courts utilize comparative fault to reduce the recoveries of products
liability plaintiffs, see…” and d, “Some courts take the position that classic assumption of the risk is a total bar to a products liability action.”).
32. Schultz v. Foster-Glocester Reg’l Sch. Dist., 755 A.2d 153 (R.I. 2000).
33. Id. at 154. The Supreme Court provided, “Patricia said she went to the
school nurse who, after manipulating the injured elbow, sent her back to practice. According to Patricia, she then continued to participate in practice, performing what she described as painful physical activities until she stopped and
went home. Patricia, in her answers to interrogatories, stated that as a result
of her fall, she suffered a 100 percent displaced radial head fracture of her right
elbow.”
34. Id. at 155.
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summary judgment and remanding the case for trial.35 The court
stated:
In the instant case, it is clear that the school district was
aware of Patricia, and knew of her cheerleading exploits.
Patricia was both a student at the school and a member of
the cheerleading squad. Further, the squad was composed
of a small group of cheerleaders that had been practicing
together for months; clearly the cheerleading coach knew
of, and engaged in a relationship with, Patricia. Thus, we
are satisfied that Patricia’s injury was sufficiently foreseeable to trigger the special-duty doctrine and ultimately liability on the part of the school district. Although there may
have been some risk, there is always risk involved in cheerleading maneuvers. However, the particular maneuver in
this case may well involve the doctrine of assumption of the
risk. This doctrine cannot be applied in the context of summary judgment, and must be submitted to the trier of
fact.36
In sum, Rhode Island provides just a few sports law participation cases involving claims of negligence and other legal theories.
These cases do not otherwise appear to be especially unique, though
the 1970s Fiske football helmet and face-mask decision was noteworthy for its era and length, involving various other legal claims
and a large jury verdict against a prominent manufacturer despite
comparative negligence principles reducing the judgment by forty
percent even under the theories of breach of implied warranty and
strict liability.37 As noted by one author as a result of the Fiske
decision, “the law was established regarding the application of

35. Id. at 156 (remanding “for a trial on the merits relating to the question
of assumption of the risk by the minor.”).
36. Id.
37. See, e.g., Brian James Mills, Football Helmets and Products Liability,
8 SPORTS LAW. J. 153, 167-68 (2001); see also Shea Sullivan, Football Helmet
Product Liability: A Survey of Cases and Call for Reform, 3 SPORTS LAW. J. 233,
254-55 (1996); Virginia Graziani M.D. & Samuel D. Hodge Jr., A Primer on
Spinal Cord Injuries-A Medical/Legal Overview, 31 TEMP. J. SCI. TECH. &
ENVTL. L. 205, 234-35 (2012).
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comparative negligence and, if applicable, the assumption of the
risk defense in a products liability context.”38
B. Flying Objects
For years, the issue of spectator safety at baseball games has
been part of the sports law discussion.39 In 2019, for example, the
Chicago White Sox became the first Major League Baseball (MLB)
team to extend protective netting from foul pole to foul pole after
outcry over continuous spectator injuries at MLB ball parks.40 In
fact, more than 100 years prior in Rhode Island, the Providence
Grays of the National League (1879) became the first professional
team to install netting behind home plate at all.41 Two Rhode Island-related flying object cases are worth exploring though case law
related to foul balls and other objects appears to be relatively rare
and old in the state.42
First, in Reid v. R.I. Co.,43 the plaintiff:
[O]n the second day of August, 1902, was a passenger upon
one of the defendant’s cars running on Weeden street in the

38. See Jack Mahoney, Tribute to Joseph A. Kelley, 69 RHODE ISLAND B. J.
19 (2020) (“We lost a legal giant in May of this year. Joseph A. Kelly passed at
the age of 94. His elite legal career extended over 65 years. If there was a litigation hall of fame Joe would have been inducted unanimously on the first
ballot.”).
39. See Adam Epstein, Teaching Torts with Sports, 28 J. LEGAL STUD.
EDUC. 117, 119-120 (2011); see also Adam Epstein, SPORTS LAW 124 (2013).
40. Katherine Acquavella, White Sox Will Become First MLB Team to Extend Protective Netting All the Way to the Foul Poles, CBS SPORTS (June 18,
2019), https://www.cbssports.com/mlb/news/white-sox-will-become-first-mlbteam-to-extend-protective-netting-all-the-way-to-the-foul-poles/
[https://perma.cc/MJ6V-9D3C].
41. See Christine Van Dusen, Why Baseball is America’s Most Dangerous
Spectator Sport, WEEK (Aug. 31, 2014), https://theweek.com/articles/444131/why-baseball-americas-most-dangerous-spectator-sport
[https://perma.cc/FAG5-QPXP].
42. Compare James v. R.I. Auditorium, Inc., 60 R.I. 405, 199 A. 293 (1938)
(woman struck by flying hockey puck while witnessing her first professional
hockey game was justified in believing her seat was reasonably safe from danger), with Kennedy v. Providence Hockey Club, Inc., 119 R.I. 70, 376 A.2d 329
(1977) (woman struck in face by hockey puck during professional game assumed as a matter of law risk of injury by flying pucks, because she had “attended numerous hockey games and was familiar with the flying-puck syndrome.”).
43. Reid v. R.I. Co., 67 A.2d 328 (R.I. 1907).
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city of Pawtucket. It was necessary for this car to stop on
Weeden street until a certain hour, to permit another car
to pass. On this occasion, instead of stopping the car at the
usual place, which was further down the street, the conductor stopped the car directly opposite the home plate of a ball
field where a game of baseball was in progress, as it appears from his own evidence, that he might watch the
game. Two or three minutes after the car was stopped a
foul ball struck the head of the plaintiff, who was sitting in
the car with her back to an open window, and injured her
more or less severely. This suit is brought to recover damages for the alleged results of the blow.44
A jury awarded Flora Reid $2,750.00.45 The Supreme Court of
Rhode Island stated, “it was a breach of the defendant’s duty to the
plaintiff to stop the car unnecessarily in a place of danger, and all
the evidence in the case agrees with our common knowledge that a
position behind the home plate of a baseball field while a game is
going on is a position of great danger.46
In a more contemporary case, Hennessey v. Pyne,47 the issue
before the Supreme Court of Rhode Island was also its first sentence in its first paragraph:
When hitting a golf ball, does a golfer owe any duty to persons living in residences immediately adjacent to the golf
course? If so, is that duty breached when the golfer unintentionally hits a ball that veers off the course, strikes a
resident on her own property, and injures her? This appeal
from a summary judgment requires us to tee off on these
questions for the first time in Rhode Island.48
Eileen Hennessey lived in a condominium next to a golf course and
was struck in the head from a shot by the defendant Michael G.
Pyne, the assistant golf-pro at Louisquisset Golf Club, who hit from
the eleventh hole tee.49 The Superior Court judge “concluded that
as a golfer engaging in a lawful and intended use of a golf course,
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

Id. at 328-29.
Id. at 329.
Id. at 330.
Hennessey v. Pyne, 694 A.2d 691 (R.I. 1997).
Id. at 693.
Id. at 693-94.
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Pyne owed no duty to Hennessey and that therefore summary judgment should enter against her on her negligence cause of action.”50
The Supreme Court heard Hennessey’s appeal, affirmed the lower
court’s judgment related to the nuisance and assault and battery
claims including her husband’s loss-of-consortium claim, but reversed it relative to the negligence claim.51 Specifically, the Court
established the following rule:
The general rule in this type of case is that the mere fact
that a person is struck by a golf ball driven by a person
playing the game of golf does not constitute proof of negligence on the part of the golfer who hit the ball, and that a
golfer is only required to exercise reasonable care for the
safety of persons reasonably within the range of danger of
being struck by the ball . . . . Nonetheless, when . . . a golfer
knows that residences are located within striking distance
of where the golfer stands to play the ball, the risk reasonably to be perceived is such that the golfer has a duty to
exercise reasonable care for the safety of those people who
may be located within that range.52
The case was remanded to the Superior Court.53 Interestingly, the
Supreme Court referenced Mark Twain, H.L. Mencken, and humorist A.P. Herbert in the second paragraph of its decision.54 Also of
interest, all these Rhode Island cases discussed above involved female spectators who were hit by flying objects.
Indeed, the Reid case is now over a century old, it has rarely
been cited and of those decisions all are from other Rhode Island
cases. It has little impact on sports law either within or beyond the
50. Id. at 694.
51. Id. at 694-95.
52. Id. at 698 (citing Ludwikoski v. Kurotsu, 875 F. Supp. 727, 731 (D.
Kan. 1995)).
53. Id. at 701.
54. Id. at 693 (“Ever since Mark Twain quipped that golf was nothing more
than “a good walk spoiled,” the game of golf has continued to excite flamboyant
commentary concerning those who ply its greensward. The famed American
curmudgeon, H. L. Mencken, once chipped in that if he had his way, “no man
guilty of golf would be eligible to any office of trust or profit under the United
States.” A different but equally difficult lie has been played by humorist A. P.
Herbert, who took this shot: “the game of golf may well be included in that
category of intolerable provocations which may legally excuse or mitigate behavior not otherwise excusable.”).
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borders of Rhode Island other than possibly to place the incident in
an historical context of one of the country’s first foul ball cases resulting in an injured plaintiff.55 On the other hand, Hennessey has
been cited by forty-seven decisions and twenty-five other sources
since its publication in 1997.56 The Restatement Third of Torts
cites Hennessey in two places related to liability.57 Still, the case
seems to be in line with other golf ball injury cases that historically
have used a reasonable care—as opposed to recklessness—standard
for liability.58
II. SPORT AND GENDER DISCRIMINATION ISSUES

The issue of whether boys may play on girls’ teams and viceversa has been addressed by various states with differing results.59
Boys have been excluded from participating in girls’ field hockey in
high school in Rhode Island, along with Maine and New Jersey.60
The issue related to whether boys can play on girls’ field hockey
teams in Pennsylvania appears vibrant still today, and boys may

55. As of Apr.12, 2021, a Lexis Advance® search demonstrates that the
case has 13 citations, all by the Rhode Island Supreme Court from 1914-1975
and has no other citing sources.
56. As of Apr. 12, 2021, Lexis Advance® search. This decision was analyzed in 1997 Survey of Rhode Island Law: Case: Tort Law, 3 ROGER WILLIAMS
U. L. REV. 563 (1998).
57. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS, supra note 10, at Liability for
Physical and Emotional Harm, §§ 3,18 (2010).
58. See Gregory M. Dexter, Tort Liability for Golf Shots: Time to Reject the
Recklessness Standard and Respect the Rules of Golf, 9 DEPAUL J. SPORTS L.
CONTEMP. PROBS. 1, 3-4 (2012) (expressing concern and arguing against, however, over a disturbing trend by some courts to utilize a recklessness as opposed
to reasonable care standard. “Indeed, the current trend among courts is to
adopt the recklessness standard-the majority rule in the context of recreational
sports generally-to golf. This trend is a relatively new development: before
1990, no court required golfers to plead more than ordinary negligence to recover for injuries sustained by an errant golf ball. The negligence standard
requires golfers to use ordinary, or reasonable care. At its core, this standard
imposes a duty on golfers to give timely and adequate warning, customarily by
yelling “fore,” before hitting if another individual is within the “foreseeable
zone of danger.” The author continues, “The rationales for the recklessness
standard-a standard that has its roots in sports where physical contact is the
norm-simply do not hold up when applied to golf. Occupying an uncertain penumbra between negligence and intent, recklessness is a nebulous standard
incapable of being applied consistently.” Id.).
59. EPSTEIN, supra note 39, at 212-14.
60. Id.
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indeed play on a “mixed gender” sports team as long as four criteria
are met.61 In Massachusetts, boys may play on the girls’ team.62
Some states opine that field hockey is a contact sport and therefore boys may be excluded—at least under federal law—under the
contact sports exception to Title IX.63 Put differently, this means
that schools may discriminate (i.e., exclude) between the genders in
the statutorily listed sports of boxing, wrestling, rugby, ice hockey,
football, basketball, and other sports the purpose or major activity
of which involves bodily contact.64
What follows is a summary of Rhode Island cases which addressed gender-related sports law issues under state and federal
law. In fact, the solid history of gender-related cases and issues
involving Rhode Island decisions and courts is where the state
makes its mark in sports law.
A. Kleczek and Field Hockey
In Kleczek v. R.I. Interscholastic League, Inc.,65 Brian Kleczek
(through his parents) sought a preliminary injunction based on the
Equal Protection Clause of the U.S. Constitution,66 Title IX of the
Education Amendments of 1972,67 the anti-discrimination laws of

61. See Ross Lippman, Palmyra School Not Allowing Boy to Play Field
Hockey, ABC27.COM (Sept. 20, 2017), https://www.abc27.com/news/palmyraschool-not-allowing-boy-to-play-field-hockey/ [https://perma.cc/TWH3-WQ98]
(offering the four criteria under the PIAA constitution and bylaws).
62. See Cam Smith, The War against Boys Playing Feld Hockey is Picking
up Steam in Mass., USA TODAY HIGH SCH. SPORTS (Nov. 16, 2018),
https://usatodayhss.com/2018/the-war-against-boys-playing-field-hockey-isorganizing-in-mass [https://perma.cc/YVC8-AGDE] (writing, “Massachusetts
was the first state to rule it was unconstitutional to bar a player from competing based solely on gender some three decades ago.”).
63. ATHLETICS, 34 C.F.R. §106.41(b) (2019). This, then, invites a discussion
or debate as to whether sports such as soccer, lacrosse, volleyball, baseball, and
so on, are indeed contact sports and therefore members of the opposite gender
may be excluded. At the very least, it would not be inappropriate for Congress
to update the statute to include other sports such as those just aforementioned
in this footnote especially since the federal statute’s legislative history began
in 1972).
64. Id.; see also EPSTEIN, supra note 39, at 212-14.
65. 768 F. Supp. 951 (D.R.I. 1991) [Kleczek I].
66. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
67. 20 U.S.C. § 1681.
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Rhode Island,68 and the state constitution69 to allow him to participate on his high school girls’ field hockey team because there was
no boys’ team.70 Brian’s parents sought a waiver, but the Rhode
Island Interscholastic League (RIIL) refused to let him play on the
girls’ team.71 The United States District Court for the District of
Rhode Island denied the preliminary injunction, opining:
In sum, plaintiffs have not shown that they are likely to
succeed on the merits of their Title IX claim for three reasons: (1) the programs and activities of the defendants in
question do not receive federal funds; (2) the overall athletic opportunities for males at South Kingstown High
School have not been limited; and (3) the evidence indicates
that field hockey is not a “non-contact” sport.72
Not to be denied, the parents then brought the action in state
Superior Court, and the trial justice them an injunction, determining that a “strict scrutiny” review should be applied to gender classifications.73 The trial justice concluded that the league had no
compelling reason not to permit males to compete in female
sports.74
However, on appeal, the Supreme Court of Rhode Island vacated the injunction and remanded the case to the Superior Court,75
opining that even though there is state action, intermediate scrutiny was more appropriate in gender cases.76 The Court provided
some interesting language:

68. 16 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 38-1.1.
69. R.I. CONST. ART. I, § 2.
70. 768 F. Supp. at 952-53.
71. Id. at 953.
72. Id. at 956.
73. Kleczek v. R.I. Interscholastic League, Inc. (Kleczek II), 612 A.2d 734,
735 (R.I. 1992).
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 737 (“The next level of analysis is called intermediate scrutiny.
It is undisputed that intermediate scrutiny is applied to gender classifications.
Intermediate scrutiny requires “that classifications by gender must serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to achievement of those objectives” in order to be constitutional . . . classifications by
gender deserve intermediate scrutiny because most, although not all, gender
classifications by the state are not justified. Thus, intermediate scrutiny is applied, and classification by gender will only be upheld if the state can
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We are also of the opinion that intermediate-scrutiny is
particularly appropriate for gender classifications that effect athletic opportunities for boys and girls. Because of
innate physiological differences, boys and girls are not similarly situated as they enter athletic competition. Some
classifications based on gender may therefore be justified.
The classifications can reflect reasoned judgments rather
than prejudice.77
The tradition of having separate teams is based on a realization that “high school boys are substantially taller, heavier and stronger than their girl counterparts.” . . . the classifications are based on the realization that distinguishing
between boys and girls in interscholastic sports will help
promote safety, increase competition within each classification, and provide more athletic opportunities for both
boys and girls.78
In the present case under the standard we adopt, it must
be determined whether the league’s rule that prevents boys
from participating in girls’ interscholastic teams serves important governmental objectives and is substantially related to those objectives. Although it will be for the trial
justice to determine this issue, we would comment on what
constitutes an important governmental interest. We are of
the opinion that the promotion of safety and the preservation of interscholastic athletic competition for both boys
and girls constitute an important governmental interest.79
The plaintiffs lost again.80
demonstrate an important government objective.” citing Craig v. Boren, 429
U.S. 190, 197 (1976)).
77. Kleczek II at 738.
78. Id. at 739 (citing Petrie v. Ill. High Sch. Ass’n, 394 N.E.2d 855, 861 (Ill.
App. 1979)).
79. Id.
80. See also William Geoghegan, Field of His Own, THE INDEP RI. (Feb. 4,
2016),
http://www.independentri.com/independents/article_706ef923-f6b752f8-b2e6-61bc053cc715.html [https://perma.cc/Y8MN-YEGC] (authoring that
Tommy Meyer of South Kingstown, Rhode Island, started playing field hockey
with his sister but cannot play on a high school team due to RIIL rules. Also,
Meyer may have been the first boy to ask for a waiver in Rhode Island since
Brian Kleczek).
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B. Gomes and Volleyball
The 1992 Kleczek decision cited another earlier federal case
from the 1970s in Gomes v. R.I. Interscholastic League,81 in which
the District Court held that league actions constituted state action
within the purview of 42 U.S.C.S. § 1983.82 Donald M. Gomes, a
volleyball player on an all-male volleyball team at his high school
in Pennsylvania, was excluded from competition when he transferred to Rogers High School in Newport, Rhode Island for his senior year.83 Gomes, similar to Kleczek, sought an injunction to play
on the girls’ team (in this case volleyball) since the school offered no
separate male team.84 Rogers High School allowed Gomes to join
and practice with the team but did not use him in RIIL competition.85
The District Court ruled in Gomes’s favor, but the First Circuit
Court of Appeals vacated the decision.86 Indeed, the District Court
rendered its decision on May 1 to accommodate Gomes, but the
First Circuit was persuaded to stay the implementation of the order
as it could disrupt the remainder of the season.87 The next month,
on June 8, the Court of Appeals heard arguments but the season
was already done and Gomes was about to graduate from the high

81. Gomes v. R.I. Interscholastic League (Gomes I), 469 F. Supp. 659, 661
(D.R.I. 1979), vacated as moot, 604 F.2d 733 (1st Cir. 1979).
82. Id. at 661 (claiming violations of Title IX and the Fourteenth Amendment as well).
83. Id. at 660-61.
84. See id. at 661. The court noted that Donald had played on an all-boys
volleyball team in Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, before transferring, that the
RIIL did not provide volleyball competition for males and would disqualify any
team that did. Technically, though some Rhode Island high schools fielded allmale volleyball teams, they only played outside the jurisdiction of RIIL, and
Rogers High was not one of those schools. Id.
85. See id. at 661.
86. Gomes v. RI Interscholastic League (Gomes II), 604 F.2d 733, 736 (1st
Cir. 1979).
87. Id. at 735.
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school.88 The case was dismissed as moot, and the final decision
was rendered on August 31, 1979.89
C. Fortin and Little League Baseball
In Fortin v. Darlington Little League, Inc.,90 ten-year-old Allison “Pookie” Fortin was denied the opportunity to try out for Little
League baseball because of her gender. The District Court ruled
that with the public playing fields that there was a sufficient claim
of state action under the Fourteenth Amendment and 42 U.S.C. §
1983,91 but nonetheless it concluded that baseball was a contact
sport and therefore it could exclude her from competing.92
The First Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and ruled for
Fortin.93 The appellate court held that the district court’s finding
that injury would undoubtedly occur owing to the physical differences between girls and boys was unsupported and did not constitute a convincing factual rationale for the sex-based classification
that went beyond “archaic and overbroad generalizations” about
the different roles of men and women.94
It seems likely that as girls and boys mature, greater physical differences affecting athletic ability exist. But the evidence is essentially uncontroverted that the years 8-12 are
those during which girls come close to matching boys in size
88. See id. at 736.
89. Id. The court noted that Gomes only sued on behalf of himself and not
as a class (action) representative. The court also acknowledged the speed to
which it reached its jurisdiction, stating:
The Interscholastic League’s 1979 volleyball season was scheduled
from March 27 until approximately May 24. Gomes filed his complaint
around March 28 and filed an amended complaint on April 2. The district court held a hearing on Gomes’ request for a preliminary injunction on April 4, issued its opinion on May 1, and entered its order on
May 3. We stayed implementation of that order pending appeal and
set argument on the merits for the earliest date practicable. Id. at 735
n. 4.
90. Fortin I 376 F. Supp. 473, 474 (D.R.I. 1974), rev’d 514 F.2d 344 (1st
Cir. 1975).
91. Fortin I at 478.
92. Id. at 479. (“This Court takes judicial notice that baseball is a contact
sport and that at times such contacts are violent.”). Id.
93. Fortin v. Darlington Little League, Inc. (Fortin II), 514 F.2d 344, 344
(1st Cir. 1975).
94. Id. at 348 (citing Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498 (1975)).
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and physical potential. The other reasons cited by Darlington, the alleged preferences of coaches and players, the
sense of what is or is not fit for girls to do, and the like,
seem to us inadequate reasons to deny Pookie an opportunity to play on equal terms. These fall more under the
heading of those “archaic and overbroad generalizations”
rejected by the Supreme Court.95
The Court of Appeals reversed and ordered that Fortin was allowed to play so long as Darlington Little League continued to use
City of Pawtucket parks and fields.96
The Kleczek decision has had an impact far outside of Rhode
Island and in fact it was cited in the first footnote of the 2001 U.S.
Supreme Court decision in Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary
Sch. Ath. Ass’n,97 among a host of other state court decisions that
have held that state high school athletic associations may be considered state actors.98 More recently, the Eighth Circuit Court of
Appeals cited Kleczek as authority to reverse an order of the U.S.
District Court for the District of Minnesota and remand the case
back to that court to issue a preliminary injunction in favor of the
high school boys who wanted to participate on girls competitive

95. Id. at 351.
96. Id. (Note that neither the District Court not the Court of Appeals mentioned Title IX in either decision and that law did not go into effect until 1975.
Prior to passage of Title IX, cases were argued under alleged violations of the
Equal Protection Clause.).
97. Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 531 U.S. 288,
294 n.1 (2001) (“A number of other courts have held statewide athletic associations to be state actors. Griffin High School v. Illinois High School Assn., 822
F.2d 671, 674 (CA7 1987); Clark v. Arizona Interscholastic Assn., 695 F.2d
1126, 1128 (CA9 1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 818, 78 L. Ed. 2d 90, 104 S. Ct.
79 (1983); In re United States ex rel. Missouri State High School Activities
Assn., 682 F.2d 147, 151 (CA8 1982); Louisiana High School Athletic Assn. v.
St. Augustine High School, 396 F.2d 224, 227-228 (CA5 1968); Oklahoma High
School Athletic Assn. v. Bray, 321 F.2d 269, 272-273 (CA10 1963); Indiana
High School Athletic Assn. v. Carlberg, 694 N.E.2d 222, 229 (Ind. 1997); Mississippi High Sch. Activities Ass’n v. Coleman, 631 So. 2d 768, 774-775 (Miss.
1994); Kleczek v. Rhode Island Interscholastic League, Inc., 612 A.2d 734, 736
(R. I. 1992); see also Moreland v. Western Penn. Interscholastic Athletic
League, 572 F.2d 121, 125 (CA3 1978) (state action conceded).”).
98. Id.
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dance teams despite resistance from the Minnesota State High
School League.99
The Gomes decision, cited in fact by Kleczek, has had its share
of citations as well and from many more states and federal circuits.100 Still, the merits of the decision appear to hold little precedential value given that Gomes had already graduated, and the
case was dismissed as moot.101 Nonetheless it remains one of the
earliest sports law cases to challenge, under the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and Title IX, the notion that
boys may be prohibited from participating on girls’ teams at the interscholastic level for a non-contact sport. The Fortin decision has
been cited by ten federal circuits and five states in addition to
Rhode Island state courts.102 However, even decades after the
three decisions of Klezcek, Gomes, and Fortin, all appear to be a
substantial part of the current academic103 and legal discussion
99. D.M. v. Minn. State High Sch. League, 917 F.3d 994, 1003 (8th Cir.
2019) (“Here, the League does not explain how allowing boys to dance on their
schools’ competitive dance teams would be unsafe or how it would deprive girls
of opportunities to compete. Moreover, Kleczek was decided under the Rhode
Island constitution, not the U.S. Constitution. Id. at 736. We find the League’s
asserted other justifications for prohibiting boys from participating on high
school competitive dance teams unpersuasive.” The boys sought an injunction
“under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The boys alleged that the league violated their rights
under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution and under Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20
U.S.C. §§ 1681-88 (Title IX).” Id. at 998.
100. Though the Kleczek decision was cited by the U.S. Supreme Court, it
remains somewhat insular in that it has only been cited by 1st Circuit and
Rhode Island decisions. Gomes, on the other hand, has been cited 23 times
among nine federal circuits and four states other than Rhode Island as of a
Lexis Advance® search as of Nov. 7, 2021.
101. Gomes v. R.I. Interscholastic League (Gomes I), 469 F. Supp. 659, 659
(D.R.I. 1979), vacated as moot, 604 F.2d 733 (1st Cir. 1979).
102. As reflected by a Lexis Advance® search (last conducted Nov. 7, 2021).
103. See Ray D. Hacke, “Girls will be Boys, and Boys will be Girls”: The
Emergence of the Transgender Athlete and a Defensive Game Plan for High
Schools that want to Keep their Playing Fields Level-For Athletes of Both Genders, 18 TEX. REV. ENT. & SPORTS L. 131 (2018) (referencing Kleczek and
Gomes); see also Michael J. Lenzi, Comments: The Trans Athlete Dilemma: A
Constitutional Analysis of High School Transgender Student-Athlete Policies,
67 AM. U.L. REV. 841 (2018); see also Scott Skinner-Thompson & Ilona M.
Turner, Title IX’s Protections for Transgender Student Athletes, 28 WIS. J.L.
GENDER & SOC’Y 271, 278-79 (stating, “Courts have also recognized that fears
regarding males joining the sport in overwhelming numbers and denying females athletic opportunities are overblown and do not justify the exclusion of
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related to the judicial and legislative battles being waged nationwide related to transgender athlete participation at the interscholastic level and whether high school athletes who transition to the
other gender may then compete with that gender.104 The RIIL policy focuses on gender identity as opposed to gender at birth,105 and
the Rhode Island is considered an inclusive state, one of the states
in the country that does not require transgender high school athletes to take hormones or undergo sex reassignment surgery in order to participate on the team that fits their gender identity.106
This transgender participation issue also exists as a contemporary

male participants.” The article then explores the Gomes decision). For earlier
articles that discuss or cite all three cases, see Suzanne Sangree, Title IX and
the Contact Sports Exemption: Gender Stereotypes in a Civil Rights Statute, 32
CONN. L. REV. 381 (2000) (arguing that Title IX’s contact sports exception violates equal protection); see also Rebecca A. Kiselewich, Note: In Defense of the
2006 Title IX Regulations for Single-Sex Public Education: How Separate Can
Be Equal, 49 B.C. L. REV. 217 (2008) (suggesting that the single-sex programs
promoted under the regulations at that time might be able to withstand judicial scrutiny.).
104. See Dan Cancian, Transgender Athletes are Banned from Sports in
(Mar.
12,
2021),
These
States,
NEWSWEEK
https://www.newsweek.com/transgender-athletes-banned-sports-these-usstates-1575659 [https://perma.cc/RMC5-MQ98].
105. See Chris Mosier, High School Policies, TRANSATHLETE.COM,
https://www.transathlete.com/k-12 [https://perma.cc/8UV4-W28G] (last visited
Apr. 13, 2021) (providing a state-by-state update and analysis of interscholastic policies and authoring, “The Rhode Island Interscholastic League (RIIL)
policy says, ‘The RIIL recognizes the value of participation in interscholastic
sports for all member school student athletes. The RIIL is committed to providing all student-athletes with equal opportunities to participate in RIIL athletic
programs consistent with their gender identity. This policy addresses eligibility determinations for students who have a gender identity that is different
from the gender listed on their official birth certificates.’” A link is also provided in order to download the RIIL policy, RIIL Rules and Regulations–Article
3, § 3: GENDER IDENTITY (2019-2020), https://13248aea-16f8-fc0a-cf26a9339dd2a3f0.filesusr.com/ugd/2bc3fc_b3b30dbf9a594d03a5a36814034bdbb5.
pdf [https://perma.cc/8A5C-7MDF] (last visited Apr. 13, 2021).
106. See Martha Bebinger, Policies for Transgender High School Athletes
Vary from State to State, WBUR.ORG (May 9, 2016), https://www.wbur.org/commonhealth/2016/05/09/transgender-athletes
[https://perma.cc/LQ6Q-4SUP]
(authoring that while RIIL rules for transgender males are inclusive relative
to other states and that “they can play on any team they chose, according to
their ability. But transgender girls, male to female, must request an eligibility
hearing and be cleared by a panel before they can play on a girls’ team.”).
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concern or issue not just at the interscholastic level but also at the
intercollegiate and Olympic levels of competition.107
D. Cohen v. Brown University108
In 1991, Brown University’s decision to end four sports—
women’s volleyball, women’s gymnastics, men’s golf, and men’s water polo—resulted in one of the most lengthy, important, and influential cases in Title IX history.109 Brown University said the teams
could still compete as club sports, but it was not going to provide
university funding anymore.110 At that time, Brown’s student body
was comprised of 52% male and 48% female students, though 63
percent of its student-athletes were male.111 Amy Cohen, a member of the gymnastics team, sued Brown University for its elimination decision.112
The District Court issued a preliminary injunction ordering
Brown to reinstate the gymnastics and volleyball programs to
107. See Jason Scott, NCAA ‘Unequivocally Supports’ Trans Participation,
ATHLETIC BUS. (Apr. 2021), https://www.athleticbusiness.com/governing-bodies/ncaa-unequivocally-supports-trans-participation.html [https://perma.cc/
PNR5-RYPW] (quoting the NCAA’s position that it is in line with the International Olympic Committee (IOC) and U.S. Olympic and Paralympic Committee
(USOPC) policies and that it has a “long-standing policy that provides a more
inclusive path for transgender participation in college sports.” Scott stated earlier, “The NCAA statement comes as states such as Arkansas, Mississippi and
Tennessee have passed legislation aimed at blocking transgender girls from
participating in girls’ sports, amid other limitations. Similar bills are under
consideration in dozens of states.”).
108. Cohen v. Brown Univ., 809 F. Supp. 978 (D.R.I. 1992) (Cohen I); Cohen
v. Brown Univ., 991 F.2d 888 (1st Cir. 1993) (Cohen II); Cohen v. Brown Univ.,
879 F. Supp. 185 (D.R.I. 1995); Cohen v. Brown Univ., 101 F.3d 155 (1st Cir.
1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1186 (1997) (all Cohen III).
109. Cohen II, at 892 (referring to the case as a “watershed case” and yet
recognizing that “Brown will never be confused with Notre Dame or the more
muscular members of the Big Ten.” Id. at 891-92); see also EPSTEIN, supra note
39, at 216.
110. Cohen II, at 892.
111. Id.
112. Id.; see also Brown Univ., Title IX Lawsuit Initiated,
https://www.brown.edu/about/history/timeline/title-ix-lawsuit-initiated
[https://perma.cc/7F8U-FKAU] (last visited June 20, 2019) (offering, “In April
1992, Gymnastics co-captain Amy Cohen, Class of 1992, and twelve other
Brown female student-athletes brought suit against the University for violation of the 1972 Title IX legislation that stipulated that there be no genderbased discrimination in any federally funded educational activity.”).

468 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 27:3
varsity status pending the resolution of the Title IX claim.113 The
First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the preliminary injunction.114 Characterizing compliance with Title IX as “battleground,”115 the appellate court recognized that the legal battle centered on the third prong of the 1979 Policy Interpretation of Title
IX: whether it can be demonstrated that the interests and abilities
of the members of the underrepresented sex have been fully and
effectively accommodated,116 and Brown failed that test.117 After
years of litigation, the case was ultimately appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court which did not grant certiorari.118
This impactful case was in the courts for years though ultimately it settled out of court.119 Brown University was required to
113. Cohen II, at 892 (referencing the District Court decision in Cohen I).
114. Id. at 907.
115. Id. at 897.
116. Id. (referencing the Department of Health, Education and Welfare’s
(HEW) Office of Civil Rights (OCR) policy interpretation of Title IX found published in 44 FED. REg. 71,413 (1979), and mapping “a trinitarian model under
which the university must meet at least one of three benchmarks: (1) Whether
intercollegiate level participation opportunities for male and female students
are provided in numbers substantially proportionate to their respective enrollments; or (2) Where the members of one sex have been and are underrepresented among intercollegiate athletes, whether the institution can show a history and continuing practice of program expansion which is demonstrably
responsive to the developing interest and abilities of the members of that sex;
or (3) Where the members of one sex are underrepresented among intercollegiate athletes, and the institution cannot show a continuing practice of program expansion such as that cited above, whether it can be demonstrated that
the interests and abilities of the members of that sex have been fully and effectively accommodated by the present program.”).
117. Id. at 899–900 (criticizing Brown repeatedly and offering, “We think
that Brown’s perception of the Title IX universe is myopic.” Id. at 899).
118. In the Cohen III litigation [Cohen v. Brown Univ., 879 F. Supp. 185
(D.R.I. 1995); Cohen v. Brown Univ., 101 F.3d 155 (1st Cir. 1996), cert. denied,
520 U.S. 1186 (1997)], the District Court determined that Brown was out of
compliance with Title IX and ordered a comprehensive compliance plan first
within 120 days and then modified that order to 60 days. It then rejected the
plan, entering final judgment on September 1, 1995. Then, on September 27,
1995, it denied Brown’s motion for additional findings of fact and to amend the
judgment. This led to an appeal. Cohen v. Brown Univ., 879 F. Supp. 185, 187,
214 (D.R.I. 1995); Cohen v. Brown Univ., 101 F.3d 155, 162 (1st Cir. 1996).
119. The settlement is also known as the “Cohen agreement.”; see also Associated Press, Brown to Settle Title IX Suit, N.Y. TIMES (June 24, 1998),
https://www.nytimes.com/1998/06/24/sports/brown-to-settle-title-ix-suit.html
[https://perma.cc/A8A5-MEZQ]. As of Nov. 7, 2021, a Lexis Advance® search
demonstrates 121 citing decisions of the Cohen III First Circuit Court of
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keep percentage disparity within three-and-a-half percent of the total of women undergraduates.120 The settlement, known as the Cohen agreement, was officially modified on December 15, 2020,121 but
only after Brown University attempted to make controversial athletic program cuts during the COVID-19 pandemic that gained national attention.122 As a result of the latest settlement in 2020,
Appeals decision from every federal circuit except the Tenth Circuit, and 438
other citing sources of which 293 are law reviews.
120. Id.; see also EPSTEIN, supra note 39, at 216. For a thorough discussion
of the case and its litigious history, see, e.g., Erin E. Buzuvis, Survey Says…A
Critical Analysis of the New Title IX Policy and a Proposal for Reform, 91 IOWA
L. REV. 821, 864–66 (2006).
121. See Brian E. Clark, Final Court Approval of Brown v. Cohen Settlement
Sets 2024 end to Joint Agreement, BROWN.EDU (Dec. 15, 2020),
https://www.brown.edu/news/2020-12-15/settlement [https://perma.cc/3XUBGBKW]; see also Katie Mulvaney, Judge Approves Gender-equity Settlement
with Female Athletes at Brown, PROVIDENCE J. (Dec. 15, 2020),
https://www.providencejournal.com/story/news/courts/2020/12/15/judge-approves-equity-settlement-female-athletes-brown-univ/3904212001/
[https://perma.cc/X9KL-6ZSM] (authoring, “U.S. District Court Chief Judge
John J. McConnell Jr. signed off on a proposed settlement reached in September between the Ivy League school and female athletes at Brown who challenged the school’s move to cut sports programs this spring. Its terms, hailed
by both sides, set August 2024 as the end date to a 1998 joint agreement in the
landmark case Cohen v. Brown, a class action lawsuit credited with helping to
even the playing field nationwide for men’s and women’s college sports.” Mulvaney continued, “Under the settlement approved Tuesday, Brown will reinstate the varsity women’s fencing and equestrian teams-two of the five teams
cut-but it will be released from the 1998 agreement that university officials
faulted as becoming ‘a significant obstacle’ to its ability to offer women’s and
men’s teams the competitive experience they deserve.”).
122. For the short history of the whirlwind of decisions and events leading
up to the new 2020 settlement, see Katie Mulvaney, Emails Show Brown University Wants to Kill ‘Pestilential’ Agreement Giving Women Equity in Sports,
PROVIDENCE J. (Aug. 27, 2020, 3:37 PM), https://www.providencejournal.com/news/20200827/emails-show-brown-university-wants-to-killrsquopestilentialrsquo-agreement-giving-women-equity-in-sports
[https://perma.cc/LY55-R5R7]. Noteworthy, in 2020 Brown initially decided to
eliminate men’s track and field and cross-country teams along with nine other
varsity sports. See, e.g., Lincoln Shryack, Brown Cuts Men’s Track & Field/XC,
FLOTRACK.ORG (May 28, 2020), https://www.flotrack.org/articles/6748341brown-cuts-mens-track-fieldxc [https://perma.cc/9FEN-RXRC] (offering that
Brown, with a link to its “Excellence in Brown Athletics Initiative,” would transition the eleven sports cut to club status beginning with the 2020-2021 school
year but that also coed sailing and women’s sailing were upgraded from club
to varsity status. This would result in a net reduction from 38 to 29 varsity
teams). However, Brown then reversed course on the men’s track and field and
cross-country teams just a few days later. See Li Goldstein, Men’s Track, Field

470 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 27:3
today Brown University Athletics fourteen men’s sports and nineteen women’s sports, with sailing serving as a co-ed sport and listed
under both men’s and women’s sports.123
III. STATUTORY SPORTS LAW CONSIDERATIONS

Rhode Island has several sport-related statutes.124 For example, the criminal offenses under bribery make it a crime to corrupt
or attempt to corrupt a sports participant or official with a possible
punishment by a fine of not more than one thousand dollars
($1,000), or by imprisonment of not more than seven years, or
both.125 Acceptance of a sports bribe results in the same punishment.126 In fact, the failure to report such as bribery is an offense
itself.127

and Cross Country Reinstated as Varsity Sports, BROWN DAILY HERALD (June
9, 2020, 8:29 PM), https://www.browndailyherald.com/2020/06/09/mens-trackfield-cross-country-reinstated-varsity-sports/ [https://perma.cc/A6JU-YJJF];
see also Greta Anderson, Brown University Athletic Cuts Challenged in Court,
INSIDER HIGHER ED (July 1, 2020), https://www.insidehighered.com/quicktakes/2020/07/01/brown-university-athletic-cuts-challenged-court
[https://perma.cc/FV88-98QZ]; see also Greta Anderson, Brown Strikes a Deal,
INSIDE
HIGHER
ED
(Sept.
18,
2020),
https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2020/09/18/brown-will-reinstate-two-womens-teams-title-ixagreement-end [https://perma.cc/PY7R-UTN4] (reaching a settlement agreement in to end the gender equity consent agreement but in which Brown would
also reinstate women’s varsity teams in equestrian and fencing though
women’s golf, squash and skiing would not. Still, according to the settlement,
Brown is required to restore more women’s teams if it restores any more men’s
teams, also preventing any new men’s teams before 2024).
123. Brown
Univ.
Athletics,
Sports,
https://brownbears.com/
[https://perma.cc/3Y5Z-QRBH] (last visited Apr. 13, 2021).
124. See
Organization,
R.I.
INTERSCHOLASTIC
LEAGUE,
https://www.riil.org/page/2997 [https://perma.cc/52TL-3X36] (last visited Nov.
7, 2021) (the bylaws and rules related to state interscholastic competition at
Rhode Island Interscholastic League (RIIL)). For example, students who are
home schooled may participate in RIIL high school sports if five conditions are
met. Eligibility, R.I. INTERSCHOLASTIC LEAGUE, https://www.riil.org/page/3033
[https://perma.cc/R7QC-2CM5] (last visited Nov. 7, 2021).
125. 11 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 7-9 (2020) (Corruption of sports participant or official) (referencing various sports including jai alai matches and horse or dog
races).
126. 11 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 7-10 (2020) (Acceptance of bribe by sports participant or official).
127. 11 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 7-12 (2020) (Failure to report corruption of sports
participant or official) (“Any person violating the provisions of this section shall
be guilty of a misdemeanor and, upon conviction, shall be punished by a fine
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Professional boxers (and boxing officials) must first obtain a license from the state.128 Though it falls under Rhode Island General
Laws Title 41, Sports, Racing and Athletics, Chapter 5, Boxing and
Wrestling of its General Laws, Rhode Island recognizes that contemporary professional wrestling most often is scripted and therefore it allows the state’s division of gaming and athletics—at its own
discretion—to waive a “professional wrestler” from the licensing requirement in the case of wrestling as a form of pre-determined entertainment.”129
Under Rhode Island General Laws Title 5, Businesses and Professions, Rhode Island has adopted the Uniform Athlete Agents
Act.130 Failure to comply with that framework, when an athlete
agent may contact a student athlete, could result in a misdemeanor
violation.131 Educational institutions may also sue the agent civilly
for damages caused by a violation of the chapter.132
Rhode Island has a sports concussion statute known as the
School and Youth Programs Concussion Act (SYPCA).133 In 2014,
Rhode Island amended SYPCA to direct the department of education and department of health to promulgate guidelines for teachers
and teachers’ aides, in conjunction with the RIIL, to complete a
training course in concussions and traumatic brain injuries.134
Coaches, volunteers and nurses who fall under the statutory

not exceeding one thousand dollars ($1,000), or by imprisonment for not more
than one year, or both.”).
128. 41 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 5-7 (2020) (License required for participants and
officials in professional matches).
129. 41 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 5-21 (2020) (Application of chapter to wrestling
matches).
130. 5 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 74.1-2 (2020) (Definitions).
131. 5 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 74.1-15 (2020) (Criminal penalties) (referring to the
permitted agent contact rules outlined in § 74.1-14).
132. 5 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 74.1-16 (2020) (Civil remedies).
133. 16 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 91-1 (2020) (School and Youth Programs Concussion Act, enacted in 2010, amended in 2014).
134. 16 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 91-3 (2020).
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framework135 must complete a training course and annual refresher courses.136
Finally, the State of Rhode Island has had to address sports
gambling under both a regulatory scheme137 and decades ago as a
matter of criminal misconduct.138 On November 26, 2018, Twin
River Casino in Lincoln became the first casino in New England to
accept bets on professional sports.139 In 2019, the law was modified

135. Compare 16 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 91-2 (2020) (“For the purpose of this section, the term ‘youth sports programs’ means any program organized for recreational and/or athletic competition purposes by any school district or by any
school participating in Rhode Island Interscholastic League Competition, and
whose participants are nineteen (19) years of age or younger.”), with 16 R.I.
GEN. LAWS § 91-4 (2020) (“All other youth sports programs not specifically addressed by this statute are encouraged to follow the guidance set forth in this
statute for all program participants who are age nineteen (19) and younger.”).
136. 16 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 91-3(b) (2020) (“All coaches and volunteers involved in a youth sport or activity covered by this chapter must complete a
training course and a refresher course annually thereafter in concussions and
traumatic brain injuries. All school nurses must complete a training course
and an annual refresher course in concussions and traumatic brain injuries.
Teachers and teachers’ aides are strongly encouraged to complete the training
course in concussions and traumatic brain injuries. Training may consist of
videos, classes, and any other generally accepted mode and medium of providing information.”).
137. See 42 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 61.2-3.3 (2020) (The framework falls generally
under Chapter 61, State Lottery; Chapter 61.2 Video-Lottery Games, Table
Games and Sports Wagering; and then in particular Sports Wagering Regulation); see also 42 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 61.2-5 (2020) (Allocation of Sports-Wagering
and Online Sports Wagering Revenue); see also Rhode Island Sports Betting,
LEGAL
SPORTS
REPORT,
https://www.legalsportsreport.com/ri/
[https://perma.cc/42SZ-KRDY] (last visited Nov. 7, 2021). Rhode Island became
the eighth state to offer sports betting in 2018, months after the Supreme
Court in Murphy v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 138 S. Ct. 1461 (2018) determined the Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act of 1992 (PASPA)
was unconstitutional.
138. See Tim Layden, You Bet Your Life the Stakes are High for Athletes
and Other Students Who Gamble, SI.COM (Apr. 17, 1995),
https://www.si.com/vault/1995/04/17/8093410/you-bet-your-life-the-stakesare-hight-for-athletes-and-other-students-who-gamble
[https://perma.cc/JU59-G8RT] (writing, “In ‘92 five members of the men’s basketball team at Bryant College in Smithfield, R.I., fell $54,000 in debt betting
with a student bookie. Christopher Simmons, a co-captain on the Bryant basketball team, and Scott Kent, a former University of Rhode Island football
player, were each sentenced to five years’ probation and 100 hours of community service.”).
139. See Jennifer McDermott, Rhode Island Casino is 1st in New England
for
Sports
Betting,
AP
NEWS
(Nov.
26,
2018),
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to allow for mobile sports betting and in 2020 Rhode Island added
fully mobile sports betting.140
CONCLUSION

This Article has demonstrated that Rhode Island has various
cases and statutes related to sports law worth exploring despite its
small geographic size and population. Claims of negligence by athletic participants against each other, against sports product designers and manufacturers, and those cases involving injuries suffered
by spectators or bystanders due to flying objects all combine to show
that Rhode Island has some gems to offer in the field of sports law.
The state clearly makes its mark, however, in the various gender discrimination cases from decades ago. These cases involved
legal challenges for courts as to whether a boy may participate on a
high school girls’ field hockey team, whether a boy could participate
on a girls’ volleyball team, whether a girl could play Little League
Baseball, and the iconic decisions and ultimate settlement in Cohen
v. Brown Univ. which, at the time, was undoubtedly the most important Title IX decision of that era.
Rhode Island also has sport-related laws found in various parts
of its statutes. This includes various crimes on the books related to
sports bribery, a licensing requirement for those associated with
professional boxing, and the adoption of the Uniform Athlete
Agents Act. It also includes a contemporary training requirement
for teachers and many others related to youth sport and concussions under its School and Youth Programs Concussion Act
(SYPCA). A statutory framework now exists for sports gambling in
which it was the eighth state to legalize such wagering activity.
Rhode Island’s sports law cases are relatively few, but they are
in line with mainstream decisions. Indeed, its impact has served
as solid precedent within federal and state jurisdictions and as a
https://www.apnews.com/07a8cf1b9e1c41de82276da72137595d
[https://perma.cc/23E6-ZTAS].
140. See Adam Candee, Don’t Expect Rhode Island Sports Betting to Go Mobile Anytime Soon, LEGAL SPORTS REPORT (Apr. 25, 2019), https://www.legalsportsreport.com/31651/rhode-island-mobile-sports-betting-launch/
[https://perma.cc/MFX3-VJV5]; see also Ryan Rodenberg, United States of
Sports Betting: An Updated Map of Where Every State Stands, ESPN (Nov. 4,
2021, 11:49 PM), https://www.espn.com/chalk/story/_/id/19740480/the-unitedstates-sports-betting-where-all-50-states-stand-legalization
[https://perma.cc/Y3UX-LT9S].
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resource among academic discourse nationwide. Given Rhode Island’s generous policy related to gender identity transgender participation at the interscholastic level, it would not be a surprise to
see the state again at the center of discussion as other states address their own statutes or policies on gender participation accordingly.

